# Measures of dependability and security

D.M. Nicol, W. Sanders, K.S. Trivedi Model-Based evaluation: From Dependability to Security IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, Vol. 1, N. 1, 2004

D. P. Siewiorek R.S. Swarz, Reliable Computer Systems Prentice Hall, 1998

## Outline

#### Reliability and Availability modelling

- Exponential failure law for the hardware
- Combinatorial models
  - Series/Parallel
  - Fault Trees
- State-based models
  - Discrete time Markov chain
  - Continuous time Markov chain

#### Security modelling

- Security policy, Vulnerability, Adversary profile
- Combinatorial models
  - Attack trees
- State-based models
  - Attack-state graphs
  - ADVISE

# Quantitative evaluation of Dependability

Faults are the cause of errors and failures. Does the arrival time of faults fit a **probability distribution**? If so, what are the parameters of that distribution?

Consider the time to failure of a system or component. It is not exactly predictable - **random variable**.



Evaluation of Failure rate, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), Reliability (R(t)), Availability (A(t)) function

# Definition of dependability attributes

#### **Reliability - R(t)**

conditional probability that the system performs correctly throughout the interval of time [t0, t], given that the system was performing correctly at the instant of time t0

#### Availability - A(t)

the probability that the system is operating correctly and is available to perform its functions at the instant of time t

# Definitions

#### Reliability R(t)

#### Unreliability Q(t)

#### Failure probability density function f(t)

the failure density function f(t) at time t is the number of failures in  $\Delta t$ 

#### $R(0) = 1 \quad R(\infty) = 0$

$$Q(t) = 1 - R(t)$$

$$f(t) = \frac{dQ(t)}{dt} = \frac{-dR(t)}{dt}$$

Failure rate function 
$$\lambda(t)$$

the failure rate  $\lambda(t)$  at time t is defined by the number of failures during  $\Delta t$  in relation to the number of correct components at time t

$$\lambda(t) = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)} = \frac{-dR(t)}{dt} \frac{1}{R(t)}$$

# Hardware Reliability


- λ(t) is a function of time(bathtub-shaped curve )
- λ(t) constant > 0
  in the operational phase

Constant failure rate  $\lambda$ 

(usually expressed in number of failures for million hours)


 $\lambda = 1/200$  one failure every 2000 hours

Early life phase: there is a higher failure rate due to the failures of weaker components (result from defetct or stress introduced in the manufacturing process). Wear-out phase: time and use cause the failure rate to increase.



Taken from: [Siewiorek et al.1998]

# Hardware Reliability



 $f(t) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t}$ 

the exponential relation between reliability and time is known as **exponential failure law** 

# Time to failure of a component

• Time to failure of a component can be modeled by a random variable X

F<sub>x</sub>(t) = P[X<=t] (cumulative distribution function)

 $F_{x}(t)$  unreliability of the component at time t

• Reliability of the component at time t

 $R(t) = P[X > t] = 1 - P[X \le t] = 1 - F_X(t)$ 

R(t) is the probability of not observing any failure before time t

## Time to failure of a component

#### Mean time to failure (MTTF)

is the expected time that a system will operate before the first failure occurs (e.g., 2000 hours)

$$\mathsf{MTTF} = \int_0^\infty tf(t)dt = \int_0^\infty t\lambda e^{-\lambda t} dt = \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

 $\lambda = 1/2000$ 0.0005 per hourMTTF = 2000time to the first failure 2000 hours

#### **Failure in time (FIT)**

measure of failure rate in 109 device hours

1 FIT means 1 failure in 109 device hours

# Failure Rate

- Handbooks of failure rate data for various components are available from government and commercial sources.
- Reliability Data Sheet of product

#### **Commercially available databases**

- Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-217F
- Telcordia,
- PRISM User's Manual,
- International Eletrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard 61508

# Distribution model for permanent faults

#### MIL-HBDK-217 (Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment -Department of Defence)

Statistics on electronic components failures studied since 1965 (periodically updated). Chip failure rates in the range 0.01-1.0 per million hours

# $\lambda = \mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{L}}\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{Q}}(\mathsf{C}_{1}\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{V}} + \mathsf{C}_{2}\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{E}})$

- $\tau_{\rm L}$  = learning factor, based on the maturity of the fabrication process
- $\tau_Q$  = quality factor, based on incoming screening of components
- $\tau_T$  = temperature factor, based on the ambient operating temperature and the type of semiconductor process
- $\tau_{\scriptscriptstyle E}$  = environmental factor, based on the operating environment
- $\tau_v$  = voltage stress derating factor for CMOS devices

C<sub>1</sub>, C<sub>2</sub> = complexity factors (based on number of gates, or bits for memories and number of pins)

# Model-based evaluation of dependability

a model is an abstraction of the system that highlights the important features for the objective of the study

Methodologies that employ combinatorial models: Reliability Block Diagrams, Fault tree, ....

State space representation methodologies: Markov chains, Petri-nets, SANs, ...

#### offer simple and intuitive methods of the construction and solutions of models

Assumptions:

- independent components
- each component is associated a failure rate
- model construction is based on the structure of the systems (series/parallel connections of components)
- inadequate to deal with systems that exhibits complex dependencies among components and repairable systems

Series: all components must be operational (a)

 $R_i(t)$  reliability of module i at time t



If each individual component i satisfies the exponential failure law with constant failure rate  $\lambda_i$ :

$$R_{series}(t) = e^{-\lambda_1 t} \dots e^{-\lambda_n t} = e^{-\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i t}$$

Unreliability function

 $Q_{series}(t) = 1 - R_{series}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} R_i(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} [1 - Q_i(t)]$ 

If the system does not contain any redundancy, that is any component must function properly for the system to work, and if component failures are independent, then

- the system reliability is the product of the component reliability, and it is exponential


- the failure rate of the system is the sum of the failure rates of the individual components

**Parallel**: at least one of the components must be operational (b)

$$Q_{parallel}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(t)$$
  

$$R_{parallel}(t) = 1 - Q_{parallel}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} [1 - R_i(t)]$$


Note the duality between Q and R in the two cases




Assume N identical modules and M of those are required for the system to function properly, the expression for reliability of M-of-N substems can be written as:

$$R_{M-of-N}(t) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-M} \frac{N!}{(N-i)!i!} R^{N-i}(t) (1-R(t))^i$$

i number of faulty components





(b)


If the system contain redundancy, that is a subset of components must function properly for the system to work, and if component failures are independent, then

- the system reliability is the reliability of a series/parallel combinatorial model


Series/Parallel models

An example:

Multiprocessor with 2 processors and three shared memories



## TMR versus Simplex system



## TMR: reliability function and mission time

 $R_{simplex} = e^{-\lambda t}$  $MTTF_{simplex} = \frac{1}{\lambda}$ 

TMR system  $R_{TMR} = 3e^{-2\lambda t} - 2e^{-3\lambda t}$ 


MTTF<sub>TMR</sub> = 
$$\frac{3}{2\lambda} - \frac{2}{3\lambda} = \frac{5}{6\lambda} < \frac{1}{\lambda}$$
  
TMR worse than a simplex system

but

TMR has a higher reliability for the first 6.000 hours


TMR operates at or above 0.8 reliability 66 percent longer than the simplex system

S shape curve is typical of redundant systems: above the knee the redundant system has components that tolerate failures; after the knee the system has exhausted redundancy



# Hybrid redundancy with TMR

Symplex system  $\lambda$  failure rate m  $R_m = e^{-\lambda t}$  $R_{sys} = e^{-\lambda t}$ 



Hybrid system n=N+S total number of components S number of spares


Let N = 3  $R_{SDV}(t) = 1$ 

- $\lambda$  failure rate of on line comp
- $\lambda$  failure rate of spare comp

The first system failure occurs if 1) all the modules fail; 2) all but one modules fail

$$R_{Hybrid} = R_{SDV}(1 - Q_{Hybrid})$$

 $R_{Hybrid} = (1 - ((1-R_m)^n + n(R_m)(1-R_m)^{n-1}))$ 




Taken from: [Siewiorek et al.1998]

R<sub>Hybrid(n+1)</sub> - R<sub>Hybrid(n)</sub> >0

adding modules increases the system reliability under the assumption **R**<sub>SDV</sub> independent of n

## Hybrid redundancy with TMR

Hybrid TMR system reliability R<sub>s</sub> vs individual module reliability R<sub>m</sub>




System with standby failure rate equal to on-line failure rate

TMR with one spare is more reliable than simplex system if  $R_m > 0.23$ 

Taken from: [Siewiorek et al.1998]

S is the number of spares  $R_{SDV} = 1$ 



System with standby failure rate equal to 10% of on line failure rate

TMR with one spare is more reliable than simplex system if  $R_m > 0.17$ 

Consider the combination of events that may lead to an undesirable situation of the system


Describe the scenarios of occurrence of events at abstract level


Hierarchy of levels of events linked by logical operators

The analysis of the fault tree evaluates the probability of occurrence of the root event, in terms of the status of the leaves (faulty/non faulty)

Applicable both at design phase and operational phase

Describes the Top Event (status of the system) in terms of the status (faulty/non faulty) of the Basic events (system's components)





Components are leaves in the tree


Component faulty corresponds to logical value **true**, otherwise **false** 

Nodes in the tree are boolen AND, OR and k of N gates

The system fails if the root is true

#### Example


- Multiprocessor with 2 processors and three shared memories
  - -> the computer fails if all the memories fail or all the processors fail



## Conditional Fault Trees

Example

Multiprocessor with 2 processors and three memories: M1 private memory of P1, M2 private memory of P2, M3 shared memory.



- Assume every process has its own private memory plus a shared memory
- Operational condition: at least one processor is active and can access to its private or shared memory

**repeat instruction**: given a component C whether or not the component is input to more than one gate, the component is unique

## Conditional Fault Trees

If the same component appears more than once in a fault tree, the independent failure assumption. We use conditioned fault tree is violated

If a component C appears multiple times in the FT


$$Q_{s}(t) = Q_{S|C \text{ Fails}}(t) Q_{C}(t) + Q_{S|C \text{ not Fails}}(t) (1-Q_{C}(t))$$

where

# S|C Fails is the system given that C failsandS|C not Fails is the system given that C has not failed

#### Minimal cut sets

1. A cut is defined as a set of elementary events that, according to the logic expressed by the FT, leads to the occurrence of the root event.




2. To estimate the probability of the root event, compute the probability of occurrence for each of the cuts and combine these probabilities

Cut Sets

Top =  $\{1\}, \{2\}, \{G1\}, \{5\} = \{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5\}$ Minimal Cut Sets Top =  $\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5\}$ 

## Minimal cut sets



 $Q_{si}(t)$  = probability that all components in the minimal cut set Si are faulty


 $Q_{Si}(t) = q_1(t) q_2(t) ... q_{ni}(t)$  with  $Si = \{1, 2, ..., ni \}$ 

The numerical solution of the FT is performed by computing the probability of occurrence for each of the cuts, and by combining those probabilities to estimate the probability of the root event

Top = {1}, {2}, {3, 4}, {5} Assumption: independent faults of the components

Minimal Cut Sets

#### Minimal cut sets



Minimal Cut Sets Top = {1}, {2}, {3, 4}, {5}  $S_1 = \{1\}$   $S_2 = \{2\}$   $S_3 = \{3, 4\}$   $S_4 = \{5\}$ 

 $Q_{Top}(t) = Q_{S1}(t) + ... + Q_{Sn}(t)$ 

n number of mininal cut sets

Identification of critical path of the system

- Definition of the Top event
- Minimal cut set (minimal set of events that leads to the top event)

Analysis:

- Failure probability of Basic events
- Failure probability of minimal cut sets
- Failure probability of Top event
- Single point of failure of the system: minimal cuts with a single event

#### **State-based models**

#### State-based models

Characterize the state of the system at time t:

- identification of system states
- identification of transitions that govern the changes of state within a system


Each state represents a distinct combination of failed and working modules

The system goes from state to state as modules fail and repair


The state transitions are characterized by the probability of failure and the probability of repair

#### Markov model

graph where nodes are all the possible states and arcs are the possible transitions between states (labeled with a probability function)



#### **Reliability model**



#### Availability model

#### Markov models

Markov models (a special type of random process) :

Basic assumption: the system behavior at any time instant depends only on the current state (independent of past values)

Main points:

- systems with arbitrary structures and complex dependencies

- assumption of independent failures no longer necessary

- can be used for both reliability and availability modeling

#### Markov process

In a general random process  $\{X_t\}$ , the value of the random variable  $X_{t+1}$  may depend on the values of the previous random variables

$$X_{t0} X_{t1} \dots X_{t}$$

#### Markov process

the state of a process at time t+1 depends only on the state at time t, and is independent on any state before t

$$\mathcal{P}\{X_{t+1} = j | X_0 = k_0, \dots, X_{t-1} = k_{t-1}, X_t = i\} = \mathcal{P}\{X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i\}$$

#### Markov property: "the current state is enough to determine the future state"

#### Markov chain

A Markov chain is a Markov process X with discrete state space S

A Markov chain is homogeneous if it has *steady-state transition probabilities* 

$$\mathcal{P}\{X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i\} = \mathcal{P}\{X_1 = j | X_0 = i\} \ \forall t \ge 0$$

The probability of transition from state i to state j does not depend by the time. This probability is called p<sub>ii</sub>

$$p_{ij} = \mathcal{P}\{X_1 = j | X_0 = i\}$$

We consider only *homogeneous* Markov chains

- discrete-time Markov chains (DTMC) / Continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC)

# Transition probability matrix

If a Markov process is finite-state, we can define the transition probability matrix P (nxn)

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} p_{11} \cdots p_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots \\ \vdots & \ddots \\ p_{n1} \cdots p_{nn} \end{bmatrix},$$

$$p_{ij} = \mathcal{P}\{X_1 = j | X_0 = i\}$$

**pij** = probability of moving from state i to state j in one step

#### row i of matrix P:

probability of make a transition starting from state i

#### column j of matrix P:

probability of making a transition from any state to state j

# Discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC)

#### State space distribution

State occupancy vector at time t

$$\pi(t) = [\pi_0(t), \pi_1(t), \pi_2(t), ...]$$

Probability that the Markov process is in state i at time-step t

$$\pi_i(t) = P\{X_t = i\}$$

$$\pi(0) = (\pi_1(0), ..., \pi_n(0))$$

A single step forward

 $\pi(1) = \pi(0) \mathsf{P}$ 

State occupancy vector at time t  $\pi(t) = \pi(0) P^{t}$ 

System evolution in a finite number of steps computed starting from the initial state distribution and the transition probability matrix

# Limiting behaviour

A Markov process can be specified in terms of the state occupancy probability vector p and a transition probability matrix P

 $\pi(t) = \pi(0) Pt$ 

The limiting behaviour of a DTMC (steady-state behaviour)

# $\lim_{t\to\infty}\pi(t)$

The limiting behaviour of a DTMC depends on the characteristics of its states. Sometimes the solution is simple

## Time-average state space distribution

For periodic Markov chains


 $\lim_{t\to\infty} \pi(t)$ 

$$\mathsf{P} = \begin{array}{c} 1 & 2 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 2 \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

doesn't exist (caused by the probability of the periodic state)

Compute the time-average state space distribution, called  $\pi^*$ 

$$\pi^* = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^t \pi(i)}{t}$$



state i is periodic with period d=2

$\pi(0) = (1,0)$	
$\pi(1) = \pi(0) P$	$\pi(1) = (0,1)$
$\pi(2) = \pi(1) P$	$\pi(2) = (1,0)$

•••••


### Simplex system


{X<sub>t</sub>} t=0, 1, 2, .... S={0, 1}

- all state transitions occur at fixed intervals
- probabilities assigned to each transition
- The probability of state transition depends only on the current state

State 0 : working State 1: failed


p<sub>f</sub> Failure probability







State 0 : working State 1: failed


p<sub>f</sub> Failure probability p<sub>r</sub> Repair probability







State j can be made an trapping state with pjj = 1



probability of being in a state after n time-steps

$$[p_0(n), p_1(n)] = [p_0(0), p_1(0)] \begin{bmatrix} 1 - p_f & p_f \end{bmatrix}^n \\ p_r & 1 - p_r \end{bmatrix}^n$$

# Continuous-time Markov model

- state transitions occur at random intervals
- transition rates assigned to each transition

#### Markov property assumption

the length of time already spent in a state does not influence either the probability distribution of the next state or the probability distribution of remaining time in the same state before the next transition

These assumptions imply that the waiting time spent in any one state is exponentially distributed

Thus the Markov model naturally fits with the standard assumptions that failure rates are constant, leading to exponential distribution of interarrivals of failures


state 0: working state 1: failed

 $\lambda$  failure rate  $\mu$  repair rate

Continuous time

Transition matrix P: transition rate

Probability of being in state 0 or 1 at time t+ $\Delta t$ 



$$\mathsf{P} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \lambda \Delta t & \lambda \Delta t \\ \mu \Delta t & 1 - \mu \Delta t \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} p_0(t+\Delta t), p_1(t+\Delta t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p_0(t), p_1(t) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1-\lambda\Delta t & \lambda\Delta t \\ \mu\Delta t & 1-\mu\Delta t \end{bmatrix}$$
  

$$\uparrow$$
probability of being in
state 0 at time t+\Delta t


Performing multiplication, rearranging and dividing by  $\Delta t$ , taking the limit as  $\Delta t$  approaches to 0:

$$\frac{dp_0(t)}{dt} = -\lambda p_0(t) + \mu p_1(t)$$
$$\frac{dp_1(t)}{dt} = \lambda p_0(t) - \mu p_1(t)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{dp_0(t)}{dt} , \frac{dp_1(t)}{dt} \end{bmatrix} = [p_0(t), p_1(t)] \begin{bmatrix} -\lambda & \lambda \\ \mu & -\mu \end{bmatrix}$$

#### T matrix

Continuous time Markov model graph



Taken from: [Siewiorek et al.1998]

The change in state 0 is minus the flow out of state 0 times the probability of being in state 0 at time t, plus the flow into state 0 from state 1 times the probability of being in state 1.

The set of equations can be written by inspection of a transition diagram without self-loops and  $\Delta t$ 's


$$p_{0}(t) = \frac{\mu}{\lambda + \mu} + \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \mu} e^{-(\lambda + \mu)t} \qquad \qquad A(t)$$
$$p_{1}(t) = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \mu} - \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \mu} e^{-(\lambda + \mu)t}$$

Taken from: [Siewiorek et al.1998]

p<sub>0</sub>(t) probability that the system is in the operational state at time t, availability at time t

The availability consists of a steady-state term and an exponential decaying transient term

# Availability as a function of time



# Continuous-time Markov models: Reliability


#### Single system without repair

- failed state as trapping state
- $\lambda$  = failure rate
- $\lambda \Delta t$  = state transition probability

$$1 - \lambda \Delta t$$
 (1) 1

$$\mathsf{T} = \begin{bmatrix} -\lambda & \lambda \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

#### Continuous time Markov model graph



We can prove that:  


$$p_0(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$
Reliability
$$p_1(t) = 1 - e^{-\lambda t}$$
Unreliability

### TMR system with repair

Rates:  $\lambda$  and  $\mu$ 

Identification of states: 3 processors working, 0 failed 2 processors working, 1 failed 1 processor working, 2 failed

p(0) = [1, 0, 0]




**Reliability** R(t) = 1 - p2(t)

$$T = \begin{bmatrix} -3\lambda & 3\lambda & 0\\ \mu & -2\lambda-\mu & 2\lambda\\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$R(t) = \frac{5\lambda + \mu + \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2}}{2\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2}} \exp(-(1/2)(5\lambda + \mu - \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2})t)$$

$$-\frac{5\lambda + \mu - \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2}}{2\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2}} \exp(-(1/2)(5\lambda + \mu + \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2})t)$$


#### Comparison with nonredundant system and TMR without repair



# Dual processor system with repair

A, B processors Rates:  $\lambda 1,\,\lambda 2$  and  $\mu 1,\,\mu 2$ 

Identification of states: A, B working A working, B failed B working, A failed A, B failed




#### **Availability**

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A(t) = p_0(t) + p_1(t) + p_2(t)
A(t) = 1 - p_3(t)
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Rates:  $\lambda 1 = \lambda 2$  and  $\mu 1 = \mu 2$ 

p(0) = [1, 0, 0]

$$\mathbf{T} = \begin{bmatrix} -2\lambda & 2\lambda & 0 \\ \mu & -\lambda - \mu & \lambda \\ 0 & \mu & \mu \end{bmatrix}$$



Taken from: [Siewiorek et al.1998]

**Availability** 

 $A(t) = 1 - p_2(t)$ 

### Dual processor system with repair


$$A(t) = \frac{2\lambda\mu + \mu^2}{2\lambda^2 + 2\lambda\mu + \mu^2} - \frac{4\lambda^2 \exp\left(-(1/2)\left[(3\lambda + 2\mu) + \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu}\right]t\right)}{\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu + (3\lambda + 2\mu)\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu}}$$
$$- \frac{4\lambda^2 \exp\left(-(1/2)\left[(3\lambda + 2\mu) - \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu}\right]t\right)}{\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu - (3\lambda + 2\mu)\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu}}$$

$$A_{ss} = \frac{2\lambda\mu + \mu^2}{2\lambda^2 + 2\lambda\mu + \mu^2}$$

#### Steady state value

### Reliability model

making state 2 a trapping state




$$\mathsf{T} = \begin{bmatrix} -2\lambda & 2\lambda & 0 \\ \mu & -\lambda - \mu & \lambda \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

**Reliability**  $R(t) = 1 - p_2(t)$   $R(t) = p_0(t) + p_1(t)$ 

$$R(t) = \frac{4\lambda^2 \exp(-(1/2)(3\lambda + \mu - \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 6\lambda\mu + \mu^2})t)}{(3\lambda + \mu)\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 6\lambda\mu + \mu^2} - \lambda^2 - 6\lambda\mu - \mu^2} - \frac{4\lambda^2 \exp(-(1/2)(3\lambda + \mu + \sqrt{\lambda^2 + 6\lambda\mu + \mu^2})t)}{(3\lambda + \mu)\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 6\lambda\mu + \mu^2} + \lambda^2 + 6\lambda\mu + \mu^2}$$

# TMR system with repair

Rates:  $\lambda$  and  $\mu$ 



# Comparison with nonredundant system and TMR without repair

