

Verifying data secure flow in AUTOSAR models by static analysis

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Abstract This paper presents an approach for enhancing the design phase of AUTOSAR models when security annotations are required. The approach is based on information flow analysis and abstract interpretation. The analysis evaluates the correctness of the model by assessing if the flow of data is secure with respect to causal dependencies within the model. To find these dependencies an exhaustive search through the model is required. Abstract interpretation is used as a trade-off between precision and complexity of the analysis. The approach also supports designers in providing annotated models where the security of data flow has a low impact on the performance of the model.

Keywords AUTOSAR · Security · Information flow · Static analysis

1 Introduction

Modern automotive electronics systems are real-time embedded system running over networked Electronic Control Units (ECU) interconnected by wired networks such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) or Ethernet. Moreover, wireless connectivity is increasingly used for additional flexibility and bandwidth for features like key-less entry, diagnostic, and entertainment. This increased connectivity leads to an increasing number of potential cyber-security threats. Security in automotive is therefore becoming increasingly important and should be taken into account from the early stages of software development.

As part of recent extensions and developments, AUTOSAR [2], the reference standard for designing automotive systems, now offers a set of security-related

services, which provides security functions such as encryption, integrity and authentication of messages exchanged over the car networks. However, AUTOSAR does not provide any means to specify security requirements at the level of application components, but rather requires the application developers to directly use the standard security services. This is somewhat in violation of the established AUTOSAR methodology that relies on code generation from high level specifications for all the communications and scheduling features.

To overcome this limitation, the work [13] extends AUTOSAR models with a set of security annotations that are assigned to system components and communication links between components at application level. Annotations specify the integrity and confidentiality requirements on a link, and the level of trust we have to place in components to provide the expected function, or service. The work [14] presents code generation features to automatically synthesise the right services to achieve secure communications exploiting the security annotations.

However, the way in which security annotations are specified must consider the causal dependencies between data that traverse the model. For example, let us consider a Brake component which receives data originated by sensors (e.g., radars and cameras), and pre-processed by an Object Detection component. If Brake requires integrity on its input data, then integrity must be guaranteed also along the path from the data originators to Brake, including communications between sensors and Object Detection component, otherwise, the security constraint cannot be satisfied and the set of annotations is not correct.

AUTOSAR provides information of which functional entity (runnable) reads from or writes onto ports of components, but using this information for deriving the

causality between data and for assigning correctly the annotations demands a huge utilisation of security operations thus introducing performance penalties. This issue is particularly critical in the automotive domain where software components run on a resource-limited computer network and have real-time constraints.

This work deals with the problem of correctly assigning the security annotations.

As a first contribution, a security formal property of AUTOSAR models, named *Data secure flow* is defined, and a method to formally prove such property is provided. *Data secure flow* property guarantees that, considering data causalities, the security annotations written in the model at design time are correct.

As a further contribution, this work provides a method to discover data dependencies with a finer level of granularity with respect to the information already provided by AUTOSAR. The analysis of data dependencies is based on abstract interpretation [16], a static analysis technique for the automatic extraction of information about the possible executions of programs.

As last contribution, data dependencies can also be exploited to strategically annotate an AUTOSAR model with the levels necessary to fulfil the *data secure flow* property, thus limiting the usage of security services. One of the advantages of our approach is that, being based on abstract interpretation, the analysis can be fully automated. Moreover, the analysis scales up, since runnables of AUTOSAR software components are analysed separately. A tool has been developed that supports the analysis.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reports on related work. Section 3 introduces the background on AUTOSAR models and information flow analysis. Section 4 provides a comprehensive description of the proposed approach. Section 5 describes the implementation of the method, and provides information on the developed tool. Section 6 shows the application of the approach to a case study.

2 Related work

This section reports on the research works about automotive security issues and information flow analysis.

2.1 Security

Recent research has shown that it is possible for external intruders to intentionally compromise the proper operation and functionality of modern automotive electronics systems. In [22], it has been demonstrated that if an adversary were able to communicate on one or

more of a car internal network buses, then this capability could be sufficient to maliciously control critical components across the entire car.

The work [15] demonstrated that external attacks are indeed feasible and categorised external attack vectors as a function of the attacker ability to deliver malicious input via particular modes: indirect physical access, short-range wireless access, and long-range wireless access. Further remote attacks have been recently demonstrated in [36].

Security has been taken into account in the early phases of the development cycle of automotive electronics systems, both by enforcing software programming standards that prevent software defects that may enable cyber-attacks [15], as well as by implementing security mechanisms for secure communication [24,25], including software delivery, installation and flashing [1,34]. Factors like Required Resources and Required Know-How have been considered in the SAHARA (Security-Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) method for defining threats criticality [27].

In [13,14] a set of modelling extensions to address AUTOSAR cyber-security requirements at design stage has been defined. Security requirements are realised as stereotypes extending the AUTOSAR implementation provided by the IBM Rhapsody tool [18]. A similar approach has been used in SecureUML to model systems with role-based access control policies [26], and in umlsec to specify confidentiality properties of message communication [19]. Concepts and mechanisms that allow us to model confidentiality and authentication requirements at a higher abstraction level have been proposed in [31].

2.2 Data flow

Data flow in AUTOSAR models is analysed in the application configuration phase, where runnables must be grouped into tasks. Tasks are the unit of scheduling of the AUTOSAR operating system and they are executed in sequence. If a runnable reads data produced by another runnable, the first runnable cannot start until the second runnable finishes. The dependencies among runnables are computed by assuming that any communication implemented between two runnables represents a dependency [20].

The dependencies among runnables enable a correct parallel execution of runnables, so they must be respected also in the migration from single core to multi-core architectures [29], [20]. In [21] a tool for supporting parallel execution is developed. The tool executes data dependency analysis directly on AUTOSAR mod-

els to detect critical dependencies. The static data dependency analysis approach is defined in [30].

All approaches above apply data-flow analysis to obtain the dependencies among runnables for identifying a proper execution order of runnables. The dependencies are computed by considering their accessed data. If any execution path of a runnable receives data on a port, the runnable depends on the runnable that sent such data.

In our work, the result of a data flow analysis, is the basis for checking the secure data flow in security annotated AUTOSAR models. For what concerns the data flow analysis, our approach differs from those mentioned above because we find dependencies at a finer granularity level: our iterative data flow analysis computes dependencies among data read from or written onto ports of the whole AUTOSAR model. Data secure flow property is computed by an algorithm that abstracts from data and considers only the security level of the data. The abstract interpretation approach has been used for both the implementation of the data-flow analysis and the checking of secure flow property.

2.3 Secure flow

Data flow analysis is the basis for secure information flow in programs. The secure flow property in programs was first formulated in [11]. Successively, in [17], program certification was addressed, which statically checks secure information flow by inspecting the dependencies among variables in the program. Works on static analysis techniques for information flow security in programs can be divided into type-based approaches and semantic-based approaches. In type-based approaches the security of a variables belongs to its type and secure information flow is checked by type systems [35, 12]. An approach has been presented in [37] based on a continuation passing style translation of programs (continuations are used to handle implicit flows), while the work [9] handles secure information flow in object oriented languages. In semantic-based approaches, abstract interpretation is applied. For example, the work [28] presents a method based on denotational semantics, while the works [10] [8] are based on the operational semantics. In [23] an approach is presented based on axiomatic semantics, while the work [33] defines a method based on partial equivalence relations. The reader can refer to [32] for a survey.

The approach proposed in this paper relies on abstract interpretation of the operational semantics. The analysis is based on a transition system and thus has the advantage of being fully automatic. Our work differs from previous work because in AUTOSAR, we have

both a set of component based modelling constructs, and a programming language used to describe the behaviour of runnable entities. Moreover, with respect to [10], data types and functions are included in the analysis.

3 Basic Concepts

This section provides an introduction to AUTOSAR and some basic knowledge about information flow analysis.

3.1 AUTOSAR

AUTOSAR is an open industry standard for automotive software architecture, founded in 2003 and developed by a partnership of automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), suppliers and tool vendors [2]. AUTOSAR provides both a standard language for the description of application components and their interfaces, and a methodology for the development process. A fundamental concept in AUTOSAR is the separation between application and infrastructure, see Figure 1. In particular, AUTOSAR defines a three-layered architecture consisting of:

- Application layer
- Runtime Environment (RTE) layer
- Basic Software (BSW) layer

The Application Layer contains the Software Components (SWCs) developed for the automotive system functions by suppliers. The RTE layer is a middleware layer, automatically generated by tools and providing a communication abstraction for software components. Finally, the BSW layer provides basic services and basic software modules to software components. Within the BSW layer, AUTOSAR makes security mechanisms available to the developers in three different modules: a) the *Secure On-board Communication* (SecOC) module [7], which routes IPDUs (Interaction layer Protocol Data Units) with security requirements; b) the *Crypto Abstraction Library* (CAL) [5], which implements a library of cryptographic functions; and, finally, c) the *Crypto Service Manager* (CSM) [6], which provides software components with cryptographic functions implemented in software or hardware.

The application SWCs communicate using ports that express client-server relationships or sender-receiver data interactions. The development of the SWCs relies on the RTE specified by AUTOSAR to deliver the conceptual foundation for the communication of SWCs with each other and the use of BSW




Fig. 1 AUTOSAR architecture.

services. The internal behaviour of SWCs consists of runnables or functional units, represented by a function entry point. Each runnable indicates the port it uses. Runnables internal to a SWC can communicate also through global variables and inter-runnable variables.

An example is shown in Figure 2. `Runnable1a` of SWC1 communicates with `Runnable2a` of SWC2 through sender-receiver ports; `Runnable1c` of SWC1 communicates with `Runnable1a` of the same SWC through an inter-runnable variable. Moreover, `Runnable2c` of SWC2 communicates with `Runnable1d` of SWC1 through a client-server port.

In [13], AUTOSAR models are extended with *security annotations*. In short, two modelling extensions are introduced:

- the *trust level* of a software component, or of a port
- the *security requirement* of a communication link

A software component (or a port) may be associated with a trust level which specifies to what extent it can be trusted to provide the expected function, or service, with respect to attacks targeting the component itself. Without loss of generality, we assume two trust levels: *high* and *low*.

A communication link may be associated with a security requirement which represents the level of security of data sent on the link must satisfy. The security re-

quirement can take one of the following values: *none*, *conf*, *integr*, *both*, which, respectively, codify no security, confidentiality, integrity and, both confidentiality and integrity. During the design phase of the automotive system, designers can assign these annotations to components and links according to their knowledge of the system.

As an example, let us consider the annotated AUTOSAR model shown in Figure 3. The example represents a typical active safety application that makes use of information coming from sensory input devices (e.g., lidars, radars, cameras, and GPS) in order to sense the surrounding environment and detect road marks and objects (e.g., vehicles, pedestrians) on and around the street. These information items are forwarded to several navigation and active safety functions, including, for example, Path planning, Lane keeping and Lane Departure warning, which produce commands for the actuation systems (steering, throttle and brakes).

PathPlanning software component and port `p` of the Throttle software component are assigned *high* trust level, while the other elements are assigned *low*. Throttle request link is annotated with data integrity security requirement (*integr*), while the other communication links have no security requirements (*none*). Therefore, according to annotations, data input to the Throttle component at port `p`, on the Throttle_request link, must




Fig. 2 An example of AUTOSAR application model.

have a *high* trust level and integrity security requirement (*integr*).

3.2 Secure information flow

In this section we briefly recall basic concepts of secure information flow in a program [17].

A program, with variables partitioned into two disjoint sets of high and low security, has secure information flow if observations of the final value of the low security variables do not reveal any information about the initial values of the high security ones.

Assume y is a high security variable and x a low security one. Examples of violation of secure information flow are:

- $x := y;$
- $\text{if } (y = 0) \text{ then } x \text{ else } x := 1;$

In both cases, checking the final value of the low security variable x reveals information on the value of the higher security variable y . In the first case, there is an explicit information flow from y to x (variable x is assigned the value of y). In the second case there is an implicit information flow from y to x , since variable x is assigned different values depending on the value of the condition of the control instruction if , that depends on variable y .

A conditional instruction in a program causes the beginning of an implicit flow. The implicit flow begins when the conditional instruction starts (we say that we have an opened implicit flow); all the instructions in the scope of the if depends on the level of the condition of the if . In case of nested conditional instructions,

we have the dependency from all the conditions of the opened implicit flows.

Information flow occurs also through global variables and function calls in the program. Finally, when a function call is executed in the scope of a conditional instruction, the function is executed under the implicit flow. For example,

- $\text{if } (y < 0) \text{ then } f();$

Function $f()$ is invoked depending on the value of variable y . Instructions in the code of $f()$ are executed only if the value of variable y is less than 0. Instructions of $f()$ are executed under the implicit flow of the condition of the if statement.

The analysis of secure information flow can be executed using an abstract interpretation approach [16] based on the operational semantics of the language [10]. In this case

- the standard operational semantics of the programming language is enhanced to include information on security level of values.
- abstract domains are identified and abstract semantics rules are defined that execute the program on abstract domains that contain only security levels.
- the abstract rules compute the flow of information in the program.

In the following, the basic concepts of the analysis are shown.

A program is a sequence of instructions $q = q_0 q_1 \dots q_n$. Let m be a memory that contains all the variables accessed by the program. The execution of the program is a transition system obtained by executing q starting from the initial memory m , by applying the rules of the operational semantics of the language.




Fig. 3 An example of security annotated model in Rhapsody.

The semantics is expressed by inference rules in the form $\frac{A}{C}$ where A is the antecedent and C is the consequent. The intuitive interpretation of a rule is that the consequent can be inferred from the antecedent.

Given a pair $\langle q_i, m \rangle$ of an instruction q_i and a memory m , \longrightarrow represents the execution of q_i in m . The rule for a simple expression consisting of a variable x is:

$$\text{Expr} \quad \frac{}{\langle x, m \rangle \longrightarrow m(x)}$$

An empty antecedent corresponds to the boolean value **true**. It is always true (antecedent) that the evaluation of the expression x is the value of x in m (consequent). The rule for the assignment is :

$$\text{Ass} \quad \frac{\langle e, m \rangle \longrightarrow k}{\langle x := e, m \rangle \longrightarrow m[k/x]}$$

If the evaluation of the expression e in memory m is k (antecedent), then the execution of $x := e$ changes memory m , by assigning value k to variable x (consequent). We assume $m[k/x]$ is a memory equal to m except for the variable x that is assigned k .

The operational semantics of the language is extended to convey the security level of data during the execution. We added two elements to the execution:

- *annotated values*. Each value is annotated with a security level τ , which considers the security level of all data on which the value depends.

Data become pairs (k, τ) , where k is the value and τ is the security level.

- *execution environment*. Each instruction q_i is executed under an environment σ that represents the level of the implicit flows caused by conditional instructions. For example, the level of a variable is given by the highest level between the level of the data in the variable and the level of the environment in which the instruction is executed.

We use the pair $\langle \hat{m}, Env \rangle$ to represents the memory defined on extended values (\hat{m}) and the execution environment (Env). The inference rules above become the following:

$$\text{Expr} \quad \frac{\hat{m}(x) = (k, \tau)}{\langle x, (\hat{m}, \sigma) \rangle \longrightarrow (k, \sigma \cup \tau)}$$

The notation $\langle x, (\hat{m}, \sigma) \rangle$ represents the evaluation of variable x in memory \hat{m} under the environment σ .

$$\text{Ass} \quad \frac{\langle e, (\hat{m}, \sigma) \rangle \longrightarrow (k, \tau')}{\langle x := e, (\hat{m}, \sigma) \rangle \longrightarrow \hat{m}[(k, \tau')/x]}$$

The notation $\langle e, (\hat{m}, \sigma) \rangle$ represents the evaluation of expression e in memory \hat{m} under the environment σ .

If the level of the expression e is (k, τ') (antecedent), then the assignment updates the memory \hat{m} assigning (k, τ') to variable x (consequent).

The abstract semantics abstracts from actual values and maintains only dependency levels. Let M be the abstract memory.

The inference rules above become:

$$\mathbf{Expr} \quad \frac{M(x) = \tau}{\langle x, (M, \sigma) \rangle \longrightarrow \sigma \cup \tau}$$

$$\mathbf{Ass} \quad \frac{\langle e, (M, \sigma) \rangle \longrightarrow \tau'}{\langle x := e, (M, \sigma) \rangle \longrightarrow M[\tau'/x]}$$

A program is executed on the abstract domain starting from the abstract initial memory, and applying the abstract rules. In the abstract execution, all branches of conditional/iterative instructions are always executed, due to the loss of real data in the abstract semantics. Then the execution of the program with the abstract semantics captures all information flows.

4 Proposed approach

This section contains a general overview of the proposed approach, followed by the formal definition of data secure flow property along with an algorithm for its verification. Finally, dependencies between data read from or written onto ports of SWCs in AUTOSAR are analysed.

4.1 Overview

In the analysis, all the data is assigned a pair

$\langle \text{trust level}, \text{security requirement} \rangle$

that characterises its degree of security. As data flow through the components and the communication links, its degree of security is updated with the less secure annotation encountered.

Given an AUTOSAR model, secure flow is verified if the degree of security of data sent on a link has no lower **trust level** and no lower **security requirement** than those assigned by the designer through the security annotations.

Informally, an AUTOSAR model satisfies data secure flow if for each link $l = (p_i, p_j)$

- the trust level of data sent on link l is not lower than the trust level assigned to port p_j ;
- the security requirement of data sent on link l is not lower than the security requirement assigned to l .

Let us consider the AUTOSAR model shown in Figure 3. The model is correct if data sent on the Throttle_request link have a trust level greater or equal than *high*, because the port p on Throttle has been assigned *high*.

Using the information in AUTOSAR (for simplicity, assume components are implemented with only one

runnable each), data sent by PathPlanning depend on all its input data. The trust level of data sent on Throttle_request link is the lowest level of the traversed components (Camera, Lidar, Radar, GPS, etc.), *low* in this case. The model is not correct, and to satisfy secure flow, all these components must be assigned *high*. However, this set of *high* trust level components can be oversized, because it does not rely on real dependencies. Assume the case in which the real dependencies for output data of PathPlanning are known (dotted lines internal to the component in the figure). Since data sent on Throttle_request ultimately depends only on data produced by GPS, secure flow is verified by simply assigning *high* trust level to GPS. The resulting set of *high* trust level components is smaller than the previous one, thus reducing the overhead caused by security operations.

Similar reasoning applies to links. With reference to Figure 3, data on the Throttle_request link must have integrity security requirement (*integr*). Using the information in AUTOSAR, the data sent on Throttle_request link depends on data at the input ports of the component PathPlanning, thus in order to satisfy secure flow all the involved links must guarantee integrity. Using the real dependencies, it is sufficient that the Vehicle_position communication link is assigned *integr* security requirement.

The exact information on data dependencies requires to know the code of runnables, and runnables must be executed on every possible input data. This work proposes a solution based on a trade-off between the precision of the analysis and its complexity. An approximation of the real data dependency is computed using an abstract interpretation approach, that statically computes dependencies by abstracting from real values and considering only dependency levels.

4.2 Data secure flow property

Given an AUTOSAR model, we use the following notations and definitions:

- $C = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k\}$ is the set of SWCs.
- R is the set of all runnables.
- VIR is the set of inter-runnable variables, VG is the set of global variables of SWCs.
- $P = \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$ is the set of ports of SWCs.
- $L = \{l_1, \dots, l_m\}$ is the set of links. A link denotes a connection between two ports. The link $l = (p_i, p_j)$ connects the port p_i to the port p_j , with p_i output port of the sender SWC and p_j input port of the receiver SWC.
- $\text{cmp}(p)$ is the component to which port p belongs.

- $\text{trustlevel}(c)$ is the trust level assigned to software component c .
- $\text{trustlevel}(c, p)$ is the trust level assigned to port p of software component c .
- $\text{securityreq}(l)$ is the security requirement assigned to link l .
- $\text{Deps}(p)$ is the set of ports on which the data written onto port p depends.

Let us introduce the following definitions.

Definition 1 (lattice) Let A be a set and \sqsubset an order relation on A . The pair (A, \sqsubset) is a lattice if every pair of elements in A has both a greatest lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub).

Definition 2 (trust level) Let $A = \{low, high\}$ be the set of trust levels, ordered by $low \sqsubset high$, where \sqsubset is the lower between levels. (A, \sqsubset) is a lattice. We have that $glb(low, high) = low$ and $lub(low, high) = high$.

Definition 3 (security requirement) Let $B = \{conf, integr, both, none\}$ be the set of security requirements of links, partially ordered by the \sqsubset , with $none \sqsubset conf \sqsubset both$ and $none \sqsubset integr \sqsubset both$. (B, \sqsubset) is a lattice. We have that $conf$ and $integr$ are not ordered with respect to each other, because one is not "lower in security degree" than the other, $glb(integr, conf) = none$ and $lub(integr, conf) = both$.

Definition 4 (Data secure flow property) Given an AUTOSAR model with security annotations, the model satisfies the data secure flow property if for each link $l = (p_i, p_j) \in L$:

$$\delta_l \not\sqsupseteq \text{trustlevel}(c, p_j) \wedge \mu_l \not\sqsupseteq \text{securityreq}(l)$$

where $c = \text{cmp}(p_j)$ and, δ_l and μ_l are the lowest trust level and the lowest security requirement of data sent onto link l .

In the analysis, we compute the lowest trust level and the lowest security requirement of data sent onto a link l ($\langle \text{trust level}, \text{security requirement} \rangle$), with the algorithm shown in Listing 1. The algorithm records in δ_l and μ_l such levels ($\langle \delta_l, \mu_l \rangle$).

Assume $l = (p_i, p_j)$. Data sent to the link are data written onto port p_i .

First the algorithm sets δ_l equal to the greatest trust level and μ_l equal to the greatest security requirement. Then for each port p on which data sent on the link l depends ($p \in \text{Deps}(p_i)$), δ_l is updated to consider the trust level of the port p : the trust level δ_l is set equal to the greatest lower bound between the current value and the trust level of the SWC to which port p belongs.

Finally, for each link l' traversed by data sent on link l (source and destination ports of l' belong to $\text{Deps}(p_i)$), μ_l is set equal to the greatest lower bound between the current value and the security requirement of the link l' . Note that, at each step δ_l and μ_l can only be downgraded.

Given a link $l = (p_i, p_j) \in L$,

1. $\langle \delta_l, \mu_l \rangle = \langle high, both \rangle$
2. $\forall p \in \text{Deps}(p_i)$:
 $\delta_l = glb(\delta_l, \text{trustlevel}(\text{cmp}(p)))$
3. $\forall l' = (q, q') \mid q, q' \in \text{Deps}(p)$:
 $\mu_l = glb(\mu_l, \text{securityreq}(l'))$

Listing 1 Algorithm for data security of link l .

The fulfilment of data secure flow property is highly dependent on function Deps . For example by choosing an approach based on the information already provided by AUTOSAR, we overestimate the set of dependencies, leading to the need of more security operations. By using an approach that analyses the runnable entities we can implement a Deps function that retrieves the minimal set of dependencies.

4.3 Dependencies between data in AUTOSAR

In the following we define Deps used in our approach.

Let us consider an AUTOSAR model. Data written at port p_j does not depend on a data read from port p_i (p_j does not depend on p_i for short) if, changing the data at p_i , the data written onto p_j are always the same. We formally define port dependencies as follows.

Definition 5 (Port dependencies) Given a model, let $p_j(p_1, \dots, p_{i-1}, v, p_{i+1}, \dots, p_n)$ be the data written onto port p_j when v is read from input port p_i . A port p_j does not depend on the port p_i if:

for each possible execution, for each pair of data v_1, v_2 at p_i , with $v_1 \neq v_2$, it is:

$$p_j(p_1, \dots, p_{i-1}, v_1, p_{i+1}, \dots, p_n) = p_j(p_1, \dots, p_{i-1}, v_2, p_{i+1}, \dots, p_n)$$

Dependencies between data are computed by applying an abstract interpretation approach, similar to the one described in Section 3. The difference is that in our work the abstract domain consists of dependency levels instead of security levels.

4.3.1 Dependency levels.

In the analysis we define the set of data dependency levels Σ as the power-set of P : $\Sigma = 2^P$, i.e. the set

of all subsets of P , ordered by subset inclusion. The set Σ with the ordering relation \subseteq is a lattice (Σ, \subseteq) (i.e., every pair of elements of Σ has both a greatest lower bound, glb , and a least upper bound, lub). The lub is given by the union (\cup) and the glb is given by the intersection of subsets (\cap). Given $X \subseteq Y$, $X \cup Y = Y$ and $X \cap Y = X$. The singleton set $\{p_i\}$, (p_i for short) denotes a dependency from input port p_i . The set $\{p_i, p_j\}$ denotes dependency on both ports p_i and p_j . The minimum of Σ is the empty set \emptyset , the maximum is $\{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$ (P for short).

We extend an AUTOSAR model with the lattice of dependency levels (Σ, \subseteq) .

4.3.2 Analysis of an AUTOSAR model

Let us now consider the analysis of an AUTOSAR model. The basic idea consists in modelling ports as variables, and runnables as functions.

In particular,

- for sender-receiver data communications, reading a data from a port is equivalent to reading a variable; writing a data onto a port is equivalent to writing a variable.
- for client-server communications, the client request is equivalent to a function call, that corresponds to the invocation of the runnable implementing the requested service.

Runnables are functions, with arguments (passed by value or by reference) and return. In addition to the local memory, runnables have access to a global memory that maintains inter-runnable variables, global variables of SWCs, and communication ports. We call the set of these elements global context. In particular, in the analysis, runnables are executed in a global context A and in a local context $\langle M, Env \rangle$, which consists of a local memory M and an execution environment Env , see Subsection 2.3.

Since runnables are Misra-C [3] compliant, we need to deal with pointers, structures and arrays. In particular:

- a pointer is assumed to be simple variable, that maintains the dependencies of the pointer, plus the dependencies of the pointed data in the abstract execution.
- a structured variable is mapped to a set of simple variables, one for each member (we use the \cdot notation, as usual). If we have a variable $data$ that is a structure with two fields a and b , we map such variable into two simple variables, named $data.a$ and $data.b$, respectively.

- An array is assumed to be a simple variable, that maintains the whole dependencies of each element in the array.

```

A := A0
T := R
while(T ≠ ∅)
  select r ∈ T
  T := T − {r}
  A' := EXEC(r, A)
  if(A' ≠ A)
    A := A'
    T := R

```

Listing 2 Analysis of an AUTOSAR model

The analysis of an AUTOSAR model is based on an iterative process that performs the abstract execution of all runnables in R , using the global context file. If during the analysis a level in the global context file changes, all runnables must be re-executed.

The main steps of the iterative analysis are shown in Listing 2, where A^0 is the initial global context file.

The analysis uses the abstract interpreter EXEC to analyses a single runnable. EXEC performs an abstract execution of the runnable starting from a global context file A and producing a new global context file A' .

The analysis terminates when, starting from a global context file, all runnables are executed and the global context is not changed.

At the end of the analysis the global context file records the dependencies for ports of all the SWCs. The approach is conservative, in the sense that all possible dependencies for any real execution of the runnables are detected. False dependencies are possible, since, for example, in the abstract analysis all branches of control instructions are executed, even those that in real execution would have never been executed.

5 Implementation

This section provides the practical methods used to implement the analysis depicted in the previous section. The focuses are the resolution of RTE calls, global and local contexts management and abstract execution of runnables. This section also provides an example to better clarify the analysis. Finally this section provides details on the architecture of the tool implemented.

5.1 Calls to RTE functions

In the following it is shown how to deal with calls to RTE functions in the runnable code, through a few exemplary cases.

- Data communication ports
RTE function for reading from or writing onto ports are mapped to read and write of the port variable. For simplicity, the name of the port variable is the same name of the port.

The `ReturnType Rte_Write_Port_o(data)` function, where `data` is the function's argument and `o` is the port, is implemented as the assignment `o = data`.

The `ReturnType Rte_Read_Port_o()` function, that returns the data read from port `o`, is implemented as the expression `o`.

- Service ports
RTE functions that invoke remote services trigger the runnable that implements the service. The function implementing the service is invoked.

The function `ReturnType Rte_Call_Port_o(data)`, where `o` is the service (runnable) within the client-server interface and `data` are the arguments of `o`, is implemented as `o(data)`.

5.2 Global Context and local context

The global context records information on variables in the global memory of SWCs, communication ports of SWCs and runnable calls.

The global context file maintains:

- for each variable $v \in IRV \cup GVP \cup P$, the entry $v : \tau$, where $\tau \in \Sigma$ is the dependency level of v ;
- for each runnable $r \in R$, the entry $r(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_k)\tau; \sigma$, where τ_1, \dots, τ_k are the levels for the actual parameter, τ is the level for the return and σ is the level of the environment under which the runnable is executed (calling environment).

During the analysis, for each variable, the global context maintains the maximum dependency level of data recorded in the variable and, for each runnable, the global context maintains the maximum level of the arguments, the maximum level of the return and the maximum level of the environment, by considering all the possible invocations. On the other hand, the local context of the runnable is the pair (M, Env) . The local

memory M contains local variables (including variables modelling arguments passed by value), and the environment Env which is the level of the implicit flow caused by conditional instructions. The return of a runnable and runnable's arguments passed by reference are handled as global variables.

At the beginning of the analysis, the global context A is initialised as follows:

- each port variable p_i depends only on itself, and so it initialised to the level $\{p_i\} \in \Sigma$.
- all other variables are initially assigned the lowest level (\emptyset).
- runnables are initially assigned \emptyset for calling environment, parameters and return.

For the local context, the local memory M is initialised as follows:

- local variables are initialised to \emptyset .
- variables corresponding to arguments passed by values are initialised with the level of the argument in the local context.

The execution environment Env is initialised with the level of the calling environment of the runnable entry in the global context file.

Listing 3 shows an example of the general structure of a global context file. In the example, runnable `run1()` has one argument passed by value, and one argument passed by reference (denoted by `arg&` hereinafter).

The global context is used to take into account the interactions between runnables. Any update to the global context is permanent, and visible to other runnables. The local context of a runnable is deallocated when the analysis of the runnable terminates.

5.3 Abstract execution of a runnable

A runnable is executed by an abstract interpreter EXEC which takes as input the CFG of the runnable. In the CFG the instructions are grouped in Basic Blocks (`bb`).

Each type of instruction is assigned an abstract execution rule. The abstract execution of an instruction, updates the local context (M, Env) , and the global context A . EXEC examines one `bb` at a time and abstractly executes each instruction of the block, and propagates the updates $((M, Env)$ and A after the execution of the instructions) to successors blocks. Instructions in the scope of conditional block, are executed under the implicit flow of the condition of the control instruction in the conditional block. The set of abstract rules is shown in Appendix A.

```

% Begin Global Context
% global variables of SWCs
gv1 = {}
gv2 = {}
.....

% IRV of SWCs
irv1 = {}
irv2 = {}
.....

% ports of SWCs
p1 = {p1}
p2 = {p2}
....

% runnables of SWCs
run(a, {}) {}; {}
run1((b, {}), (c&, {})) {}; {}
run2() {}; {}

.....
%End Global Context

```

Listing 3 An example of initial global context.

Examples of CFGs are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. In the first case there is an `if` instruction, while the second shows an example of a `while` instruction.

```

int runnable1 (int a) {
    if (a>200)    a = a/2;
    else        a= a+5;
    return a;
}
int runnable2 (int a) {
    while (a>200)
        a = a -10;
    return a;
}

```

Listing 4 Code of runnables.

In Figure 4 blocks in the scope of the `if` statement (block 2), are blocks 3 and 4 (which are the successors of block 2).

In Figure 5, we note that the `while` statement is translated into a repeated `if` instruction (block 4). In this case only one of the successors of the conditional block (block 3) is in the scope of the `if`.

EXEC iteratively performs the abstract execution of the runnable starting from an initial local context $\langle M, Env \rangle$ and an initial global context A until a fixpoint is reached (i.e., during an iteration $\langle M, Env \rangle$ and A are updated, and the analysis terminates when the local and global context at the beginning and at the end of the iteration are the same). The ordering in which blocks are executed is not important, because if the A or $\langle M, Env \rangle$ change, all blocks are re-executed.




Fig. 4 CFG of runnable1 with `if`.




Fig. 5 CFG of runnable2 with `while`.

EXEC uses a table Q that implements the local context of a runnable (local memory M plus calling environment Env). Q consists of a row Q_i for each **bb** i in the CFG.

If $Q_i = \langle M, \sigma \rangle$, we have that M contains the level of the local variables when block i is executed, and σ is the level of the environment in which block i is executed. Q_i is named before-state of block i .

The execution of the instructions of block i starts from the before-state of i . The execution of the instructions generates a new state $\langle M', Env' \rangle$, named after-state of block i . The after-state is obtained as the result of the abstract execution of each instruction, according to the abstract rules in Appendix A.

After the execution of all instructions of block i , the content of the memory M' in the after-state is propagated to successors of i . For each successor j , the before-state of j (row Q_j in the table) is updated by executing the *lub* operation between the memory of the after-state of block i with the memory of Q_j .

We naturally extend the *lub* operation to memories. This corresponds to the least upper bound executed point-wise on each variable in the memory:

$$lub(M, M') : \forall var, M(var) = M(var) \cup M'(var).$$

Q_{entry} and Q_{exit} represent the entry and the exit block of the runnable, respectively.

A table T summarises information on **bbs** of the runnable. Column *Code* contains the code of the **bb**, column *Succ.* enumerates the successors of the **bb** and column *Scope* reports the blocks in scope of **bb**. Table 1 shows T for runnable2 in Figure 5.

The set of abstract rules is shown in Appendix A.

5.4 An example

Let us consider runnable2 in Figure 5. Assume the following portion of global context:

```
% Begin Global Context
....
runnable2((a, {p2})) 0 : {p1}
...
% End Global Context
```

The initial local context Q is shown in Table 2. The environment of each row is initialised with the value of the calling environment in the global context file ($\{p1\}$). The memory of Q_{entry} is computed as follows: local variables are all assigned the minimum level (\emptyset), except the variable corresponding to the argument a which assumes the value present in the global context file ($\{p2\}$). All the variables in the memory of other blocks are assigned the minimum level \emptyset .

Table 1 Table T of runnable2.

Block	Code	Succ.	Scope
Q_{entry}		2	
Q_2	goto bb4;	4	
Q_3	a = a-10;	4	
Q_4	if (a > 200) goto bb3 else goto bb5	3, 5	3
Q_5	d = a	6	
Q_6	return d	exit	
Q_{exit}			

Table 2 Initial local context Q of runnable2.

Block	Memory	Env	
Q_{entry}	$(a, p2)$	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_2	(a, \emptyset)	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_3	(a, \emptyset)	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_4	(a, \emptyset)	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_5	(a, \emptyset)	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_6	(a, \emptyset)	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_{exit}	(a, \emptyset)	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$

In the following, M_{Q_i} is the memory of the before-state of Q_i and M'_{Q_i} denotes the memory of the after-state of Q_i .

Let blocks be scheduled in ascending order of i .

- Block **entry** simply initialises the memory of its successor (block 2) $M_{Q_2} = ((a, p2)(d, \emptyset))$.
- Block 2 is executed. The rule for **goto** does not change the memory, so $M'_{Q_2} = M_{Q_2}$. Block 2 propagates the after-state to its successor (block 4): $M_{Q_4} = lub(M_{Q_4}, M'_{Q_2}) = ((a, p2)(d, \emptyset))$.
- When block 3 is executed, the rule of the assignment is applied. The *lub* between the environment ($p1$) and the level of a in M (that is \emptyset) is computed and assigned to a . $M'_{Q_3} = ((a, \{p1\})(d, \emptyset))$. The memory of the successor blocks is updated: $M_{Q_4} = lub(M_{Q_4}, M'_{Q_3})$. Therefore, $M_{Q_4} = ((a, p2)(d, \emptyset)) \cup ((a, \{p1\})(d, \emptyset))$. That is, $M_{Q_4} = ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \emptyset))$.
- Block 4 is executed and the rule for **if** is applied. The level of the condition is $\{p1, p2\}$. The environment of blocks in the scope of block 4 is updated, i.e., Env of block 3 becomes $\{p1, p2\}$. Then $M_{Q_3} = lub(M_{Q_3}, M'_{Q_4}) = ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \emptyset))$ and $M_{Q_5} = lub(M_{Q_5}, M'_{Q_4}) = ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \emptyset))$.
- The execution of block 5, assigns $\{p1, p2\}$ to d : $M'_{Q_5} = ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \{p1, p2\}))$
The after-state is propagated to the successor: $M_{Q_6} = lub(M_{Q_6}, M'_{Q_5}) = ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \{p1, p2\}))$.
- The execution of block 6, according to the rule for **return**, assigns $\{p1, p2\}$ to the return of the runnable in the global context file A and propagates the memory ($M'_{Q_6} = M_{Q_6}$) in the after-state to

Table 3 Local context Q of runnable2 after the first iteration (equal to the table at fixpoint).

Block	Memory		Env
Q_{entry}	$(a, p2)$	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_2	$(a, p2)$	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_3	$(a, \{p1, p2\})$	(d, \emptyset)	$\{p1, p2\}$
Q_4	$(a, \{p1, p2\})$	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_5	$(a, \{p1, p2\})$	(d, \emptyset)	$p1$
Q_6	$(a, \{p1, p2\})$	$(d, \{p1, p2\})$	$p1$
Q_{exit}	$(a, \{p1, p2\})$	$(d, \{p1, p2\})$	$p1$

block `exit`.

$$M_{Q_{exit}} = lub(M_{Q_{exit}}, M'_{Q_6}). \text{ Therefore, } M_{Q_{exit}} = lub(((a, \emptyset)(d, \emptyset)), ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \{p1, p2\}))) = ((a, \{p1, p2\})(d, \{p1, p2\})).$$

When all blocks have been analysed, the first iteration terminates. Local context Q obtained at the end of the first iteration is shown in Table 3.

The global context file, at the end of the iteration is the following:

```
% Begin Global Context
....

run((a, p2) {p1, p2} : p1
...
% End Global Context
```

Another iteration needs to be executed, because the global (local) context has been changed. At the end of the second iteration, since Table 3 does not change the fixpoint is reached and EXEC terminates.

5.5 The tool

In the following we describe the architecture of the tool we developed for computing data dependencies in AUTOSAR models, named ADEPT (Autosar DEpendencies Tool).

The tool has been developed entirely in C++ and consists of three main units: PARSER, RULES DB and ABSTRACT ENGINE (AE), see Figure 6. All the units rely on a library of functions called "lexAnalyzer".

The tool requires the CFG of the runnable entities to be analysed, and the global context structure. The CFG of the runnables is generated using the GCC compiler with the following developer options: `-fdump-tree-cfg-blocks-vops`. The global context structure file contains the key information required by the tool for generating the initial global context.

Once the initial global context has been created, the CFG file of the runnable entities is divided into tokens by the PARSER unit. The PARSER has been

implemented by functions within the "lexAnalyzer". Among all the functions, one of the most relevant is `tokenize(string line)` which handles the generation of tokens from a code line. Functions "isId()", "isOp()", "isNum()", "isDelim()", "isKey()" and "isType()" are used by the "tokenize()" function to detect different kind of tokens.

AE is the core unit of the tool, it gets the generated tokens, line by line, and the rules introduced in Appendix A, by the RULES DB unit. Also the rules have been implemented as functions of "lexAnalyzer". Examples of functions are "find_if()", "find_assgn()" and "find_block()". Functions "find_if()" and "find_assgn()" fulfil the if rule and the assignment rule, and are triggered by an if statement or by an assignment, respectively. The "find_block()" is triggered at the end of the analysis of each block of the CFG and is responsible for the propagation of the after-state of the current block to successors blocks.

Inside the AE unit, the EXEC component has been implemented by the "scan(global context, local context, cfg file)" function. Scan() is called every time a runnable must be analysed. EXEC performs the abstract execution of the runnable by analysing the tokens and looking for predefined patterns. When one of these is found, EXEC adopts the proper rule according to the tokens analysed and the local and global contexts are properly updated, see Figure 7.

An example that clarifies how EXEC works is related to the if statement. When the code line including the if statement is found by the PARSER, it is split into tokens and passed to the EXEC unit. EXEC will compare the token line received from the PARSER with the "if defined pattern". If they match, the "find_if()" function is called, and so EXEC will propagate all the dependencies of the variables in the if condition and the environment of the current block to the environment of the blocks that belong to the scope of the current block, as defined in the corresponding rule.

Runnable entities are analysed one by one. The analysis of a runnable is iteratively executed and terminates when the local fixpoint is reached, i.e. when the local and global context do not change after an iteration. Once local fixpoint has been reached, AE moves on to analyse the next runnable.

When all the runnables have been analysed, AE terminates, and the tool checks if the global fix point has been reached, i.e., the global context does not change after the execution of AE.

If the global fixpoint is reached, the tool terminates, providing the final global context file with the port dependencies, otherwise AE is executed again.




Fig. 6 Architecture of the tool.




Fig. 7 Behaviour of AE

6 A case study

In the following, we will consider a use case related to the Front Light Manager (FLM) tutorial described in the standard documents of AUTOSAR [4], which is focused on a very limited functional part of the front light manager, namely activating the headlight and the daytime running lights. All other lights functions (e.g. parking orientation light, fog lights, etc.) are excluded.

In particular, we consider a slightly extended version of the FLM in which:

- the headlights are turned on if the key ignition is activated, the light switch is on and the power supply voltage is within a specific range,

- meanwhile the daytime running lights are turned on if the light switch is on and the voltage from the power supply is within a specific range.

The status of the lights is reported to the driver by means of the HMI (Human Machine Interface).

We created a model with a total of 9 components which can be divided in 3 categories:

- Sensors components: Ignition Key, Light Switch and Power Supply
- Actuator components: Headlight, HMI and Daytime Running Lights
- Control components: Headlight request, Daytime Light Request and Front Light Manager

The system model described using Rhapsody is shown in Figure 8. All the ports between these components are data Receiver-Provider ports. Ignition Key and Light Switch are assumed to be simply sensor components that outputs their status and Power Supply is assumed to simply outputs the battery voltage, therefore there is no need to further develop an implementation of them. In the following we will analyse the three control software components.

6.1 Control Software Components

The Headlight_request software component is made of three runnables entities, each with a different task:

- Runnable1 receives the data from Ignition Key and forwards it to the Runnable3.
- Runnable2 receives the data from Light Switch and forwards it to the Runnable3.
- Runnable3 receives data from Power Supply and from the other Runnables and sends a request of headlights activation to Front Light Manager.




Fig. 8 Model of the Front Light Manager.




Fig. 9 Software component of Headlight Request.




Fig. 10 Software component of Front Line Manager.

The schema of the Headlight_request component is shown in Figure 9. Runnable1 and Runnable2 receive the data from input port `in1` and `in2` respectively, and forward their values to Runnable3 by means of two InterRunnable Variables, `IRV1` and `IRV2`. Runnable3 receives the value of the two IRVs and the voltage value from `in3` and checks if the voltage is within a specific range and both IRVs are 'ON'. If so it sends a request of headlights activation to Front Light Manager otherwise it stops sending request.

The `Rte.IStatus_Runnable3_RPort_in3()` is a function that returns the current status of the port `in3`, and '0' means 'no errors'. The voltage thresholds are assumed to be two global parameters of the system. The other functions are standard call to RTE functions used to read from or write onto elements of data ports or inter-runnable variables.

The Daytime_light_request software component is made of only two runnables who act like Runnable2

and Runnable3 of the Headlight Request component. The Front_light_manager software component is made of three runnables:

- Runnable1 receives the request from the Headlight Request, and forwards it to the Runnable3.
- Runnable2 receives the request from the Daytime Light Request and forwards it to the Runnable3.
- Runnable3 forwards the data to the output ports and sends a signal to the HMI actuator if at least 1 of the two kinds of lights is requested on.

The schema of the component is shown in Figure 10. Runnable1 receives the data from input port `in6` and forwards it to inter-runnable variable `IRV1`. Runnable2 receives the data from input port `in7` and forwards it to inter-runnable variable `IRV2`. Runnable3 forwards the data stored in `IRV1` and `IRV2` to `out3` and `out5`, respectively, and if at least one of the request is 'ON' it sends the signal to turn the lights on to the `out4` port, otherwise it sends the signal to turn the lights off to

```

void HR_Runnable3(void) {
    int16_T input_voltage;
    // Check port status (0 → no error)
    if (Rte_IStatus_Runnable3_RPort_in3() == 0){
        input_voltage = (int16_T)Rte_IRead_Runnable3_RPort_in3();
    }
    if ((input_voltage >= voltage_threshold1) &&
        (input_voltage <= voltage_threshold2)){
        if ((Rte_IrvIRead_Runnable3_IRV1() == KEY_ON) &&
            (Rte_IrvIRead_Runnable3_IRV2() == LIGHT_ON)){
            Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out1(REQ_HEADLIGHT_ON);
        }
        else{
            Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out1(REQ_HEADLIGHT_OFF);
        }
    }
    else{
        Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out1(REQ_HEADLIGHT_OFF);
    }
}

void FLM_Runnable3(void) {
    Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out3(Rte_IrvIRead_Runnable3_IRV1());
    Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out5((Rte_IrvIRead_Runnable3_IRV2()));
    if ( (Rte_IrvIRead_Runnable3_IRV1() == REQ_HEADLIGHT_ON) ||
        (Rte_IrvIRead_Runnable3_IRV2() == REQ_DAYTIME_ON) ){
        Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out4(LIGHTS_ON);
    }
    else{
        Rte_IWrite_Runnable3_PPort_out4(LIGHTS_OFF);
    }
}

```

Listing 5 Code of HR_Runnable3 and FLM_Runnable3.

the same port. The code of both FLM_Runnable3 and HR_Runnable3 is shown in Listing 5.

Since the basic example of the AUTOSAR standard considers the daytime lights as emergency lights to be used in the case of failure of the headlights, we assumed that a developer would request data input to Daytime_running_lights be generated by high trusted software components, and the *FLM_to_DRL* link between the Front_light_manager and the software component Daytime_running_lights satisfies integrity requirement. This corresponds to the annotation shown in Figure 8, where the port *p* of Daytime_running_lights is assigned *high* trust level and the *FLM_to_DRL* link is assigned *integr* security requirement. All the other components and links are assigned *low* and *none*, respectively.

An excerpt of the global context structure file, input to the tool for the generation of the global context, is the following:

```

% global variables
int HR_voltage_threshold1;
int HR_voltage_threshold2;

int DLR_voltage_threshold1;
...
% inter runnable variables
int16_t FLM_IRV1;
int16_t FLM_IRV2;
int16_t DLR_IRV1;
...
% ports
int in1;
int in2;
...
int out1;
int out2;
...
% functions
void flm_Runnable1() 0;
void flm_Runnable2() 0;
.....
% links
out2 -> in7;
out1 -> in6;

```

6.2 Tool application

Figure 11 reports the global context at the beginning of the analysis of the AUTOSAR model. The position (i, j) indicates if element i depends on port j . The boxed region of the matrix shows dependencies between ports. The analysis starts, assuming that each port depends only on itself (diagonal of boxed sub-matrix equal to 1).

Using a computer with Intel Core i7-4700MQ and 12 Gb of Ram the analysis completes in 349ms and the global fixpoint has been reached after 3 iterations of AE.

Figure 12 reports the global context at the end of the analysis of the AUTOSAR model. For example, we derive that port $in6$ depends on ports $in1, in2, in3, in6$ and $out1$, so $Deps(in6) = \{in1, in2, in3, in6, out1\}$

In order to check *data secure flow* property, the algorithm in Listing 1 in Section 4 is applied. Let us consider link FLM_to_DRL . From Figure 12, we derive $Deps(out5) = \{in4, in5, in7, out2, out5\}$. Let L' be the set of links whose ports belong to $Deps(out5)$, it is $(out2, in7) \in L'$.

Step 1:

$$\langle \delta_{FLM_to_DRL}, \mu_{FLM_to_DRL} \rangle = \langle high, both \rangle.$$

Step 2: $\forall p \in Deps(out5)$:

$$\delta_{FLM_to_DRL} = glb(\delta_{FLM_to_DRL}, \mathbf{trustlevel}(cmp(p)))$$

Let us consider port $in4 \in Deps(out5)$.

It is $cmp(p) = Daytime_light_request$, whose trust level is *low*.

We have:

$$\delta_{FLM_to_DRL} = glb(\delta_{FLM_to_DRL}, low) = low$$

Since $\delta_{FLM_to_DRL} \sqsubset \mathbf{trustlevel}(p)$, *data secure flow* is not satisfied.

Step 3: $\forall l \in L'$:

$$\mu_{FLM_to_DRL} = glb(\mu_{FLM_to_DRL}, \mathbf{securityreq}(l))$$

Let us consider link $(out2, in7) \in L'$, whose security requirement is *none*.

We have:

$$\mu_{FLM_to_DRL} = glb(\mu_{FLM_to_DRL}, none) = none$$

Since $\mu_{FLM_to_DRL} \sqsubset \mathbf{securityreq}(FLM_to_DRL)$, *data secure flow* is not satisfied.

A simple solution could be to assign *high* trust level to all components directly or indirectly connected to *Daytime_running_lights*, which will lead to the assignment of *high* trust level to all the other components (*Front_light_manager*, *Headlight_request*, *Daytime_light_request*, *Light_switch*, *Ignition_key*, *Power_supply*).

With our approach we can consider the data dependencies of all the three components that we have implemented and we can exploit these dependencies in order to obtain a more efficient solution, in term of less overhead for security operations.

In particular, the output port of *Front_light_manager* connected to the *Daytime_running_lights* ($out5$ in our implementation) does not depend on the input port connected to the *Headlight_request* component ($in6$ in our implementation).

Data sent on the link FLM_to_DRL depends on *Front_light_manager*, *Daytime_light_request*,

Light_switch and *Power_supply* software components and traverse the following links: DLR_to_FLM , PS_to_DLR and LS_to_DLR .

As a consequence, *data secure flow* property requires that previous SWCs are assigned *high* trust level, and previous links are assigned *integr* security requirement. The resulting security annotated AUTOSAR model is shown in Figure 13.

7 Conclusions

Security in automotive is becoming increasingly important and should be taken into account from the early stages of the system development. There are a lot of well-known techniques and tools that can be borrowed from the information security domain in order to deal with malicious intrusions on automotive systems.

In this paper *data secure flow* property has been defined, and an approach for the verification of data secure flow in security annotated AUTOSAR models is presented. The approach is based on information flow analysis and abstract interpretation. The method computes the lowest security level of data sent on a communication, according to the annotations in the model and the data causal dependencies. The method also supports developers in providing annotated models that satisfy *data secure flow*, in such a way that the set of annotations is not oversized. In particular our approach for data dependencies discovery can be put at an intermediate level between the one suggested by the information already available in AUTOSAR and the one based on exhaustive search.

The approach has been applied to the AUTOSAR *Front Light Manager* use case, using a prototype tool that implements the abstract execution of the runnables programs. The results show that it is possible to considerably reduce the resources dedicated to the security, such as the number of encryption(or hash) operations

```

Global Environment:
      in1 in2 in3 in4 in5 in6 in7 out1 out2 out3 out4 out5
HR_voltage_threshold1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR_voltage_threshold2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DLR_voltage_threshold1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DLR_voltage_threshold2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FLM_IRV1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FLM_IRV2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DLR_IRV1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR_IRV1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR_IRV2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
in7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
out1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
out2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
out3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
out4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
out5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

```

Fig. 11 Global Context file at the beginning of the analysis.

```

Global Environment:
      in1 in2 in3 in4 in5 in6 in7 out1 out2 out3 out4 out5
HR_voltage_threshold1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR_voltage_threshold2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DLR_voltage_threshold1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DLR_voltage_threshold2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FLM_IRV1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
FLM_IRV2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
DLR_IRV1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR_IRV1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR_IRV2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in6 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
in7 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
out1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
out2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
out3 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
out4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
out5 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1

```

Fig. 12 Global Context file at the end of the analysis.

invoked by components. Further studies on automotive systems can be developed to improve the efficiency of the security services, for example it may be interesting to apply some modification to the topology of the system to limit the paths from sensors to actuators that are connected to critical functions of the cars.

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


Fig. 13 Annotated model of the Front Light Manager.

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- $Q(Env[\delta/Env])$ is a local context equal to Q except for the environment that is assigned δ .
- Some rules regarding global variables are omitted, because they can easily be derived from the corresponding rule of local variable using the global context in place of the local memory. We note that, the level of variables and function’s parameters, return and environment, in the global context file A never decreases. For example, if x is in the global context, the assignment of an expression to x updates the level of x to the *lub* between the current level and the level of the expression. If x is in the local memory the assignment of an expression to x sets the level of x to level of the expression.
- When the abstract interpreter finds a function call it applies the three `invoke` rules in sequence:
- the first updates the global context with the levels of the actual parameters
 - the second updates the variables passed by reference with the level in the global context
 - the third evaluates the expression of the return of the function using the level in the global context
- When the abstract interpreter finds an assignment to a sender/receiver port, which corresponds to a send operation, the abstract rule updates both the value of the sender port and the value of the receiver port in the global context A , using the set of links L .
- When the abstract interpreter finds an assignment to a client/server port, this is transformed into a call to the runnable implementing the service. This rule is similar to a function call and it not shown in the figure.

APPENDIX A

This section reports the abstract rules for the instructions. In the rules we use the following notations:

- i is the `bb` of the CFG to which the instruction belongs.
- $lvar$ is used for local variables, $gvar$ for global variables, P for sender-receiver ports, $arg\&$ denotes arguments passed by reference, ptr is used for pointers and $array$ for arrays.
- $f()$ is used for functions, including runnables.
- $Scope(\mathbf{bb}_i)$ is a function that returns the set of blocks in the scope of the conditional instruction in \mathbf{bb}_i .
- $A[\delta/x]$ is a global context equal to A except for the variable x that is assigned δ . Similarly, for other elements in the global context.
- $Q(M[\delta/x])$ is a local context equal to Q except for the variable x in memory M that is assigned δ .

$$\begin{array}{l}
\mathbf{Expr}_{const} \quad \frac{k \in const \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma)}{\langle k, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \sigma} \\
\mathbf{Expr}_{var \in lvar} \quad \frac{x \in lvar \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma)}{\langle x, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} M(x) \cup \sigma} \\
\mathbf{Expr}_{var \in \{gvar \cup P\}} \quad \frac{x \in gvar \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma)}{\langle x, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} A(x) \cup \sigma} \\
\mathbf{Expr}_{*ptr \in lvar} \quad \frac{ptr \in lvar \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma)}{\langle *ptr, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} M(ptr) \cup \sigma} \\
\mathbf{Expr}_{array \in lvar} \quad \frac{array \in lvar \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma)}{\langle array[j], \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} M(array) \cup \sigma} \\
\mathbf{Expr}_{op} \quad \frac{\langle e_1, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta_1 \quad \langle e_2, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta_2}{\langle (e_1 \text{ op } e_2), \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta_1 \cup \delta_2} \\
\mathbf{Ass}_{var \in lvar} \quad \frac{x \in lvar \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle x := e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A, Q[M[\delta/x]] \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Ass}_{var \in gvar} \quad \frac{x \in gvar \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle x := e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A[A[x] \cup \delta/x], Q \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Ass}_{var \in P} \quad \frac{x \in P \quad (x, y) \in L \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle x := e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A[A(x) \cup \delta/x; A(y) \cup \delta/y], Q \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Ass}_{var \in arg\&} \quad \frac{x \in arg\& \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle x := e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A[f(\dots, x \cup \delta, \dots)b \cup \delta; \sigma/f(\dots, x, \dots)b; \sigma], Q \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Ass}_{*ptr} \quad \frac{ptr \in lvar \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle *ptr := e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A, Q[M(ptr) \cup \delta/ptr] \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Ass}_{array} \quad \frac{array \in lvar \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle array[j] := e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A, Q[M(array) \cup \delta/array] \rangle} \\
\mathbf{If} \quad \frac{Q_i = (M, \sigma) \quad Scope = \{j_1, \dots, j_n\} \quad \langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \delta}{\langle \text{if } e \text{ then goto } b_1 \text{ else goto } b_2, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A, Q_{j, j \in Scope}(Env[Env \cup \delta/Env]) \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Return} \quad \frac{\langle e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta}{\langle \text{return } e, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A[f(a_1, \dots, a_n)b \cup \delta; d/f(a_1, \dots, a_n)b; d], Q \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Goto} \quad \frac{}{\langle \text{goto } b_j, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A, Q \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Invoke 1} \quad \frac{\langle x_j, \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} \delta_j \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma)}{\langle \mathbf{f}(x_1, \dots, x_n), \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A[f(a_1 \cup \delta_1, \dots, a_n \cup \delta_n)b; d \cup \sigma/f(a_1, \dots, a_n)b; d], Q \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Invoke 2} \quad \frac{x_j \in arg\& \quad Q_i = (M, \sigma) \quad f(a_1, \dots, a_n)b; d \in A}{\langle \mathbf{f}(x_1, \dots, x_n), \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow \langle A, Q[M(x_j) \cup a_j/x_j] \rangle} \\
\mathbf{Invoke 3} \quad \frac{f(a_1, \dots, a_n)b; d \in A}{\langle f(x_1, \dots, x_n), \langle A, Q \rangle \rangle \rightarrow_{expr} b}
\end{array}$$