

# Random and Pseudorandom Bit Generators

- Random bit generators
- Pseudorandom bit generators
- Cryptographically Secure PRBG
- Statistical tests

## Unpredictable quantities

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


- The security of many cryptographic systems depends on the generation of **unpredictable** quantities
- These quantities must be of **sufficient size** and **random** in the sense that
  - *the probability of any particular value being selected must be sufficiently small to preclude an adversary from gaining advantage through optimizing a search strategy based on such probability*

# Random bit generator



- RBG requires a naturally occurring source of randomness



Sequence of **statistically independent and unbiased** bits

Probability of emitting a bit (1 or 0) value does not depend on the previous bits

Probability of emitting a bit value (1 or 0) is equal to 0.5

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# Hardware-based RBG



- **HW-based RBGs exploit the randomness in some physical phenomena**
- elapsed time between emission of particles during radioactive decay
- thermal noise from a semiconductor diode or resistor
- the frequency instability of a free running oscillator
- the amount a metal-insulator semiconductor capacity is charged during a fixed period of time
- air turbulence within a sealed disk drive which causes random fluctuations in disk drive sector read latency times
- sound from a microphone or video from a camera

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# Software-based RBG

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- **Random processes used by SW-based RBGs include**
- the system clock
- elapsed time between keystrokes or mouse movement
- content of input/output buffers
- user input
- operating system values such as system load and network statistics
- **A well-designed SW-based RBG uses as many sources as available**

# Design and implementation problems

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- RBG must not be subject to observation and manipulation by an adversary
- The natural source of randomness is subject to influence by external factors and to malfunction
- RBG must be tested periodically

# De-skewing techniques

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- A natural source of randomness may be defective and produce biased and correlated output bits
- **De-skewing techniques** make it possible to generate truly random bit sequences from the output bits of a defective generator
- De-skewing techniques
  - provable
  - practical

# Pseudorandom bit generation

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## **RBGs raise problems**

- Generation of (truly) random bits is an inefficient procedure in most practical systems
- Storage and transmission of a large number of random bits may be impractical
- **These problems can be ameliorated by substituting a RBG with a Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PRBG)**

## Famous quotes

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
*“Random numbers should not be generated with a method chosen at random.” —Donald E. Knuth*

*“The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance.” —Robert R. Coveyou*

*“Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin”  
—John von Neumann*

## Pseudorandom Bit Generator

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- PRBG is a **deterministic** algorithm
- An adversary must not **efficiently** distinguish between output sequences of PRBG and truly random bit sequences





- **Minimum security requirement**
  - $k$  should be sufficiently large to make an exhaustive search over  $2^k$  seeds practically infeasible
- **General requirements**
  - A PRBG passes all **polynomial-time statistical tests** if no polynomial-time algorithm can correctly distinguish between an output sequence of the generator and a truly random sequence of the same length with probability significantly greater than 0.5
  - A PRBG passes the **next-bit test** if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of the first  $l$ -bits of an output sequence  $s$  can predict the  $(l + 1)^{\text{st}}$  bit of  $s$  with probability significantly greater than 0.5
  - *These two requirements are equivalent*
- A PRBG that passes tests is said **cryptographically secure**

## Ad-hoc PRBG



- **One-way functions** can be used to generate pseudo-random bit sequences



- Although **ad-hoc techniques have not proven** to be cryptographically secure, they **appear sufficient** for most applications

## Ad-hoc PRBG: ANSI X9.17 generator

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**X9.17 generator is used to pseudorandomly generate keys and initialization vectors for use with DES**

Let  $s$  be a 64-bit random seed,  $m$  be an integer,  $k$  be DES E-D-E encryption key, and  $D$  be a 64-bit representation of time/date

1. Let  $I = E_k(D)$
2. For  $i = 1$  to  $m$  do
  1. Let  $x_i \leftarrow E_k(I \oplus s)$
  2. Let  $s \leftarrow E_k(x_i \oplus s)$
3. Return( $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m$ )

## Ad-hoc PRBG: FIPS 186

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- FIPS-approved methods for pseudo-randomly generating
  - DSA private key  $a$
  - DSA per-message secret  $k$
- Both algorithms use a **randomly generated secret seed  $s$**  and **one-way function** constructed by using either SHA-1 or DES



The security of **Cryptographically Secure PRBGs (CSPRBG)** relies on the presumed intractability of an underlying number-theoretic problem

- **RSA pseudorandom bit generator** is a CSPRBG under the assumption that **RSA problem** is intractable
- Blum-Blum-Shub pseudorandom bit generator is a CSPRBG under the assumption that **integer factorization** is intractable
- These CSPRBGs make use of modular multiplication which makes them relatively slower than ad-hoc PRBG



1. Generate two primes  $p$  and  $q$ , and compute  $n = pq$  and  $\phi = (p-1)(q-1)$ . Select a random integer  $e$ ,  $1 < e < \phi$ , such that  $\gcd(e, \phi) = 1$ .
2. Select a random number  $x_0$  (the *seed*) in the interval  $[1, n-1]$
3. For  $i = 1$  to  $l$  do
  1. Let  $x_i \leftarrow x_{i-1}^e \bmod n$
  2. Let  $z_i \leftarrow \text{lsb}(x_i)$
4. Return( $z_1, z_2, \dots, z_l$ )





- A set of statistical tests have been devised to measure the quality of a random bit generator
- While **it is not possible to prove whether a generator is indeed a random bit generator, these tests detect certain kinds of weaknesses** the generator may have (**necessary conditions**)
- Each test takes a sample output sequence and probabilistically determines whether it possesses a certain attribute that a truly random sequence would be likely to exhibit
  - Ex.: a sequence should roughly have the same number of 1's as 0's
- A generator may be *rejected* or *accepted* (not rejected)



- **Frequency test (monobit test)**. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of 0's and 1's are approximately the same
- **Serial test (two-bit test)**. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of occurrences of 00, 01, 10, 11 are approximately the same
- **Poker test**. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the sequences of length  $m$  each appear approximately the same number of times
- **Runs test**. The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of runs of various length is as expected for a random sequence
- **Autocorrelation test**. The purpose of this test is to check correlations between the sequence and shifted versions of it



- **Statistical tests give only necessary conditions** for a periodic pseudorandom sequence to look random

- *Linear congruential pseudorandom generator*

$$X_n = a X_{n-1} + b \text{ mod } n, n \geq 1$$

passes statistical tests

However, it is **predictable** and hence entirely **insecure** for cryptographic purposes

- **FIPS 140-1** specifies statistical tests for randomness